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Rationality and the experimental study of reasoning
Guy Politzer
CNRS, Saint-Denis
Abstract.  A survey of  the results obtained during the past three decades  in
some of the most widely used tasks and paradigms in the experimental study
of reasoning is presented. It is shown that, at first sight, human performance
suffers from serious shortcomings. However, after  the problems of
communication between experimenter and subject are taken into account,
which leads to clarify the subject's representation of the tasks, one observes a
better performance, although still far from perfect. Current theories of
reasoning, of which the two most prominent are very briefly outlined, agree in
identifying the load in working memory as the main source of limitation in
performance. Finally, a recent  view on human rationality prompted by the
foregoing results is described.
1. Introduction
Two areas of research in psychology are relevant to the study of
human rationality. One is the study of reasoning and problem solving.
A sample of the most important and typical laboratory tasks used in
the study of reasoning together with an overview of  performance on
these tasks will be presented. It will be followed by a critical
assessment of the results and of the interpretation commonly made of
them by investigators in this field. Economists are at the origin of the
second area of research, the study of judgment under uncertainty and
decision making. Its main results are well known and we will limit
ourselves to an examination of a few of them on the same
methodological basis used to assess the results of the first area.
Finally, it will be shown that the recent trend which brings together
the two areas of research offers new insights into the nature of human
rationality by suggesting the existence of two types of rationality.
2. Studies of reasoning in the laboratory
In a typical reasoning task, some preliminary instructions regarding
the general procedure and, if appropriate, some rough explanations
about the aim of the experiment are given to the participant, following
which the information proper relevant to the task is provided. This
generally consists of (i) the statement of either just the premises of an
argument or the whole argument, often inserted in a scenario which
provides a context; (ii) a request for completing the argument with a
conclusion (production task) or for assessing the provided conclusion
(evaluation task). Nowadays, the aim of such experiments is to test
hypotheses derived from theory, or even to perform tests between
rival theories; nevertheless, it is possible to exploit the results from a
normative point of view, provided one can identify the logical
argument treated by the participant, a critical requirement which
cannot be taken for granted. As we will see later, this argument is not
always the one intended by the experimenter.
The experimenter may interact with the participant in a variety of
ways. Perhaps the commonest way to gather data is still through
questionnaires generally administered in group. Presentation of the
test materials and data collection may also be obtained individually by
using a computer or orally in a face-to-face interview. Most
individuals tested are University students who are seldom paid for
their participation. In the next two sections, a number of classic tasks,
deductive and inductive, will be reviewed.
2.1. Studies of deduction
Following standard logic, psychologists distinguish propositional and
predicate reasoning.
2.1.1. Propositional reasoning.
Within this domain, the most thoroughly investigated task, to which
we will limit ourselves, is called conditional reasoning. It is based on
four arguments, two deductively valid:
- Modus Ponendo Ponens (MP): if P then Q;  P;  therefore Q,  and
- Modus Tollendo Tollens (MT): if P then Q;  not-Q;  therefore not-P,
and two deductively invalid, which are the fallacies of:
- Affirming the Consequent (AC): if P then Q;  Q;  therefore P,  and
- Denying the Antecedent (DA): if P then Q;  not-P;  therefore not-Q.
As with other kinds of argument, there are various ways to instantiate
the sentences; using a scenario has the disadvantage that while
evaluating the truth of the conclusion (as well as that of the premises)
participants can be influenced by their knowledge or beliefs. This is
why experimenters often create a rather decontextualised microworld,
while also avoiding over-abstracting; this can be achieved, for
instance, by asking participants to imagine a metallic board and
magnetic letters that can be put on the board. With this material, the
four arguments are as follows (referring to what there is on the board,
and using arbitrary letters):
MP: if there is a T, there is a P; there is a T;  therefore there is a P.
MT: if there is a D there is a G; there is not a G;  therefore there is not
a D.
AC: if there is a K there is a W; there is a W;  therefore there is a K.
DA: if there is a V there is a B; there is not a V;  therefore there is
not a B.
Participants are required to decide whether or not the conclusion
follows necessarily from the premises (or in a variant of the task in
which no conclusion is provided, to indicate what, if anything, follows
from the premises). Performance is robust. Considering the two valid
arguments, nearly everybody endorses the conclusion of MP, but only
about two thirds of the participants endorse that of MT. For the two
invalid arguments, between one third and two thirds correctly answer
that no conclusion follows (Evans, Newstead and Byrne, 1993). In
summary, people hardly ever err on MP, one third err on MT, and
about one half fall prey to the two fallacies of AC and DA. These
experimental data seem to confirm and specify observations already
made by the Greeks.
2.1.2. Predicate reasoning.
The two tasks that are the most studied in predicate reasoning date
back to Aristotle. The first one is called immediate inference; it
consists of elementary one-premise arguments in which the premise
and the conclusion are standard quantified sentences, i. e., sentences
of the type subject-predicate starting with all, some, or no. In
experiments, participants are presented with one premise such as, e. g.
[in a bag of marbles] some white marbles are small, and asked to
evaluate (by 'true', 'false', or 'one cannot know') one or several
conclusions suggested to them, such as all white marbles are small;
no white marble is small, etc. All… and no… sentences are called
contraries; all… and some… not sentences, as well as n o … and
some…sentences are called contradictories. Inference within a pair of
contraries or a pair of contradictories logically yields a 'false'
response, which is the answer given by most people. The picture
differs sharply for the other inferences. Inferences from all… to
some… and from no… to some…not… are valid and logically require a
'true' response, while in the other direction they are invalid and require
a 'one cannot know' response. However, only about one quarter of the
responses coincide with the formal logical response; a large majority
opt for the response 'false' in both directions. Similarly, most people
respond 'true' instead of the formal logical response 'one cannot know'
to the conclusion some… drawn from the premise some… not… and
vice versa (Begg and Harris, 1982; Newstead and Griggs, 1983;
Politzer, 1990). In sum, performance seems to be very high on one
part of these inferences but surprisingly low on the other part.
The other task studied in predicate reasoning is the most famous of all
reasoning tasks, namely Aristotle's categorical syllogisms. These are
two-premise arguments using the four standard quantified sentences;
instead of involving four different classes (the subject and the
predicate of the first premise and the subject and the predicate of the
second premise) syllogisms involve only three classes because one
class is common to either both subjects, or both predicates, or the
subject of one premise and the predicate of the other. The common
class is called the middle term and it never appears in the conclusion,
so that the latter has the other two classes as subject and predicate.
These constraints determine 64 possible pairs of premises out of
which 27 yield a conclusion that follows validly from them. Here are
two examples of syllogisms:
(At a party) (i) all the players are drinkers;  no smoker is a drinker;
what, if anything, follows ?  (ii) all the drinkers are players;  no
smoker is a drinker; what, if anything, follows ? (the solution is at the
end of this chapter). As the reader can see, the difficulty is extremely
variable: most people get the first syllogism right whereas most fail
the second one. The percentage of correct solution varies from 10%
for the hardest syllogisms to 90% for the easiest; performance is
higher on valid than invalid syllogisms (in other words, on the whole,
it is easier to find the right conclusion of valid syllogisms than to
recognise the absence of a conclusion for invalid syllogisms). A
number of response biases have been described; a bias is a feature that
characterises an erroneous answer in a systematic manner. In the
present case, it was observed long ago that participants have a
tendency to give a conclusion that reproduces the properties of the
premises (e. g., if both premises are negative, give a negative
conclusion, and so on.) Another bias consists in choosing as the
subject or the predicate of the conclusion a class that is a subject or a
predicate, respectively, in the premises; for instance, in the second
syllogism above, the tendency is to choose a conclusion in which
smoker is the subject (as in the second premise) and player the
predicate (as in the first premise). There is also a belief bias: it
consists of a tendency for people to accept the conclusions that
coincide with their beliefs, and more markedly to reject the
conclusions that contradict their beliefs, keeping constant logical
validity (Evans, Newstead and Byrne, 1993). In brief, through these
various biases - and to the extent that people are responsive to non-
logical surface features or content (as opposed to formal structure) -
people seem to exhibit illogicality.
2.2. Studies of induction
Unlike deductively valid arguments, the conclusions of which are
necessarily true if the premises are true, inductive arguments deliver a
conclusion whose truth is more or less strongly plausible. One of the
oldest inductive tasks studied in the laboratory is the letter series
completion task (Simon and Kotovsky, 1963; Kotowski and Simon,
1973). Participants are presented with a series of letters and requested to
indicate the missing letter that logically completes the series. Here are a
few examples:
1)  c d c d c d. .
2)  a t b a ta a t b a t. .
3)  m a b m b c m c d m. .
4)  w x a x y b y z c z a d a b. .
These examples are presented here in increasing order of difficulty;
hardly anybody fails to give the correct answer to the first problem,
10% fail the second, one quarter the third, and one third the last one.
Two tasks designed to study lay people's hypothesis testing behaviour
have attracted most of psychologists' work. The first one is called the
2 4 6 task (Wason, 1960). The situation is that of a game played
between the experimenter and the participant. The former chooses a
rule to generate sequences of three numbers and the latter has to
discover this rule. In order to do so, there are two sources of
information. One is the result of tests made by the participant: he
chooses triples and submits them to the experimenter, who replies
every time by 'yes' (the triple obeys the rule) or 'no' (it does not). (ii)
The other source of information is provided by the experimenter at the
beginning of the game; the participant is told that the triple 2, 4, 6  is
an example that conforms to the rule. When the participants think they
have discovered the rule, they state it; if they are wrong, the game
continues for another cycle until the stated rule is correct or the
participants give up. The rule followed by the experimenter is three
increasing numbers (integers). It is usually observed that the majority
of participants state at least one incorrect rule and that failure is not
uncommon. Strikingly, the incorrect rules proposed by participants
often express one of the salient features of the initial exemplar (2, 4,
6), such as even numbers, or increasing by two which it seems
difficult for them to eliminate. Based on this observation, there have
been many comments in terms of confirmation bias, that is, a
tendency to look for evidence that examplifies the rule rather than for
evidence that contradicts it.
The other task is, on a par with the conditional reasoning task, the
most extensively used in the study of reasoning; it is called the
selection task and is also due to Wason (1966). The participant is
presented with four cards and told that each card has a number on one
side and a letter on the other side. The four cards displayed show an
A, a K, a 4 and a 7, respectively. The participant is then asked to
consider the following rule applied to the cards: "If there is an A on
one side, then there is a 4 on the other side". The question is: "indicate
which of the four cards would need to be turned over in order to
decide whether the rule is true or false". The reader who wishes to try
to solve the task before going any further should be careful: the task is
much more difficult than it seems. With little variation across
populations, it is a very robust result that the dominant patterns of
selection are (i) the A card alone and (ii) the A card and 4 card. In
terms of individual selections, the A card is selected by most people,
the 4 card by about one half of the people, and the 7 card by a small
minority only. These results have triggered numerous experiments and
many comments on human irrationality, as they are at variance with
what is considered the normative solution from the falsificationist
point of view in inductive logic (and also from the point of view of
those who consider the task as a kind of deductive exercice in
propositional logic): (i) only the A card and the 7 card are correct
choices because  they are the only ones that can potentially falsify the
rule, and (ii) the 4 card is an incorrect choice because, although it may
confirm the rule, it cannot falsify it.
3. An assessment of performance
To the extent that, unlike the case of decision making, the
identification of the appropriate normative system to be used can be
done without much disagreement, performance is easy to assess. The
tasks that have been reviewed were designed to evaluate basic
inductive and deductive reasoning ability. At first sight, the overview
of performance is contrasted. On the one hand, there is evidence of an
overall logical competence demonstrated by the facts that performance
is clearly better than chance, and that it is nearly perfect on a number
of sub-tasks; but on the other hand, there are response biases, and
performance is surprisingly low on many sub-tasks, not to talk of the
selection task as a whole. This leaves a sizeable proportion of
participants (who, it should be rembered, are mostly University
students) apparently failing to apply some basic deductive arguments
and inductive principles or methods, a serious blow for proponents of
human rationality. But is such a conclusion correct? Before accepting
it, it seems necessary to investigate in more detail both the content of
the tasks and their demands in terms of the amount of information to
be processed.
3.1. The validity of the task: pragmatic analysis.
To begin with, is there not a problem of validity that affects the
interpretation of the results on a number of tasks? As we will see, the
answer is affirmative. The development of linguistic pragmatics in the
seventies in France (Ducrot, 1971, 1972) and in England (Grice, 1975,
1978) made available the concepts necessary for analysis of the
communication between experimenter and subject with a view to
identifying what the latter actually understands in the experimental
situation. This analysis results in determination of the interpretation of
the verbal message. In conjunction with the analysis of the
representation of the task (what the participants think the experimenter
expects them to do) based on task particulars and knowledge of the
sollicited population, it is possible to define the input information and
what the participant decides to do out of it, and check whether these
components coincide with the experimenter's expectations. Only in the
affirmative is the task valid. For a general presentation of this
approach, see Hilton, 1995; Politzer, 1986, in press; Politzer and
Macchi, 2000. Let us now review some of the tasks from this
viewpoint.
Firstly, consider conditional reasoning and the two fallacies. Notice
that in various contexts (e.g., when uttering promises or permissions)
it is often appropriate to interpret a conditional if P then Q as if and
only if P then Q (called biconditional). Now under the biconditional
interpretation the two arguments concerned are valid. By applying
some manipulation, it is possible to avoid the biconditional
interpretation (e.g. by adding a premise or by ruling out explicitly the
only if interpretation): the result is a drop by one half in the rate of
"fallacious" responses (Rumain, Connell and Braine, 1983). In brief:
(i) about half of the fallacies are cases where it is not the specific
argument prepared by the experimenter that is treated by the
participant; the latter treats correctly a different argument to which his
answer is evaluated as incorrect. (ii) the participant's interpretation of
the conditional sentence has nothing to do with formal logic; it has to
do with semantics and pragmatics and there is no normative
interpretation.
There is even more to say about the fallacies because there is another
source of apparent erroneous answer due to a failure by the
experimenter to communicate the characteristics of the expected
conclusion, namely a deductive conclusion. If the argument is tackled
from an abductive point of view (that is, an inference to a plausible
justification), the "fallacious" responses are clearly correct. When this
is taken into account, most of the remaining errors disappear
(Stilgenbauer, 2001).
In summary, the fallacies in conditional reasoning can be explained on
the basis of an interpretative phenomenon or a problem of
communication; there remains, however, one deductive argument
(MT) with a rate of error of about one third to which this explanation
does not apply and which can be regarded as a genuine limitation in
human inferential abilities.
The immediate inference task also is liable to an analysis from an
interpretive point of view. The relevant concept (also applicable to the
case of the conditional) is that of implicature. An implicature is a
proposition that is not part of the literal meaning of a speaker's
utterance but is added to it by the hearer on the basis of the context
and of mutual knowledge and expectations. So, in ordinary
conversation, saying that some white marbles are small, often
communicates the implicature that not all white marbles are small. In
standard pragmatic theory, this is based on the assumption that the
hearer expects the speaker to be as informative as is appropriate, so
that if the speaker knew or believed that all the white marbles are
small she would have said so; and consequently, the fact that she has
not said so licenses and suggests  that she does not know or believe
that this is so, hence the interpretation some, but not all. As
participants in psychological experiments are untrained in logic, they
have no reason to construe the sentences literally; rather, it must be
accepted that they interpret the sentences presented to them as they do
in daily life. It follows that the erroneous responses made to the
immediate inferences that have a some premise or conclusion
demonstrate in fact correct reasoning. Take for instance the inference
from all… to some… which literally requires a  'true' answer. When it
is interpreted as an inference from all… to some but not all… it
becomes  an inference from a sentence to its contradictory and the
answer 'false' becomes the correct one. In brief, for those immediate
inferences that have been described, performance can be considered as
excellent once the interpretative component has been taken into
account.
The pragmatic analysis of both of Wason's tasks is also illuminating.
The main source of difficulty is revealed by the consideration of the
triple 2,4,6. It has very salient features; given that it has been specially
selected and presented as an instance by the experimenter, participants
are thereby invited to assume that its features are relevant.  But in fact,
these features overdetermine the rule (the numbers need not be even,
they need not increase by two, etc., in order to follow the rule actually
used which is three increasing numbers). In brief, the example is too
specific so that it can be considered as pragmatically infelicitous.
Recent experimental data suport this analysis (Van der Henst, Rossi
and Schroyens, 2002). The whole situation is deceptive and the use of
the salient features is no clear evidence of a confirmation bias; the
extent to which there is such a bias is object of much debate (Poletiek,
2001).
Similarly, in Wason's selection task, selection of the 4 card and failure
to select the 7 card are often considered as evidence that people are
unable to look for falsificatory information. However, most research
on this task has overlooked a fundamental point: the sentence is
presented to ordinary people who interpret it as an ordinary indicative
conditional. Developing a linguistic pragmatic approach based on
relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1995), Sperber, Cara and
Girotto (1995) have argued that participants untrained in formal logic
evaluate the truth of the sentence through its testable consequences;
this is because the natural way to achieve relevance, that is, to
contribute to increase the reasoner's stock of knowledge (at a
reasonable cost in terms of mental effort) is to enable him to infer
consequences from the statement. There are three ways for a
conditional rule to be relevant in this sense. One is to make the highly
available inference of Modus Ponendo Ponens: knowing that there is
an A (select the A card) draw the conclusion that there is a 4 (look for
the number 4 at the back): this produces the first pattern of response.
The second way is to infer that there are joint cases of  A and 4,
(which is not demanded by formal logic), which suggests  to select the
A card to search for the number 4, and select the 4 card to search for
the letter A: this produces the second pattern of response and,
importantly, explains the apparent search for confirmation. The last
way to render the rule relevant is the most sophisticated: inferring that
there are no cases of A without a 4; this produces the correct pattern
(select the A card to look for 7 and select the 7 card to look for A); it is
all the more rare as the not-4 concept (that is, 7) is less salient. The
authors have provided experimental results that support their
approach. In brief, the natural way to interpret the task, far from being
the test of a hypothesis, is to chek the elementary consequences of the
conditional statement suggested by the use of language. Ironically, the
comprehension mechanisms pre-empt any reasoning mechanism, so
that the task is not one of propositional logic, or of hypothesis testing,
let alone a reasoning task in the strict sense. In a word, the selection
task is invalid as a reasoning task and cannot teach us much about
human rationality, contrary to the claims made by most commentators.
However, it does show that a small minority of people can have a
representation of the task that coincides with the expectations of the
experimenter.
3.2. The information to process: memory load
Some of the tasks reviewed earlier seem free from interpretive
difficulties and yet performance may be mediocre to say the least: in
our sample of tasks this is the case of the letter series completion task,
of syllogisms, and of MT. We are now dealing with the reasoning
process proper that leads to a conclusion. As already noticed, within
the same type of task there is a wide variety in difficulty and it is
generally agreed that this reflects differences in memory load or in the
availability of the appropriate strategies. Leaving aside the latter point
which relates to individual characteristics such as learning and
expertise, the former point is a task characteristic: different tasks and
problems require different levels of working memory capacity and the
limitation of this capacity is a fundamental feature of human cognition
Take the completion task. Success  requires the identification of a
periodicity followed by the discovery of a rule that will enable the
generation of the missing letter. In order to understand the main factor
of difficulty, the notion of a list must be defined. A list is a regular
sequence of letters whose members, each in turn, feed in the periods
of the series. For instance, in problem 2 the list is the arbitrary
sequence b a  out of which b and a in turn occupy a place in the
periods of three letters. In problem 4, there are two lists, both of which
consist of the alphabet. The period is again three letters long, the first
list provides two letters (wx in the first period, xy in the second, etc.)
and the second list provides the last letter (a, then b, etc.) The notion
of a list explains the main source of difficulty: when problems are
partitioned between easy and difficult, this categorisation correlates
very strongly with the number of lists (one versus two). Indeed, the
load in working memory differs critically depending on whether the
reasoner has to keep track of a place in just one list or in two lists.
Similarly, researchers agree that the load in working memory is the
main source of difficulty in deductive reasoning, whatever the
theoretical point of view they adopt (that of mental model theory or
that of mental rules).
Staying within the limits of the symbolic information processing
paradigm, two main, competing theoretical views on deductionexist.
Notice that both of them implicitly take some form of standard logic
to be normative. The mental rule approach (Braine and O'Brien, 1998;
Rips, 1994) hypothesizes that the human mind is equiped with a set of
core rules (similar to some of the rules that belong to Gentzen's natural
deduction system); an inference is performed like a formal proof. One
of the main predictions of this view is that the longer the derivation is,
the more difficult the inference should be, because the memory load
increases with this length. The mental model approach hypothesizes
that people construct an abstract, internal representation of the
meaning of the premises, which may result in one or more models; an
inference is performed by considering a putative conclusion
(presented to the reasoner, or which (s)he has identified in the model
under consideration, and inspecting the other models in an attempt to
falsify this putative conclusion: the conclusion follows validly if it
holds in all the models. The main prediction is that the more models
there are to inspect, the greater the difficulty of the inference, as the
memory load increases with this number.
Take for instance Modus Tollendo Tollens (if P then Q;  not Q;
therefore not-P). In mental rule theory, this argument does not belong
to the core rules, and therefore it must be derived. Given the first
premise (if P then Q), the reasoner supposes P and right away infers Q
by applying MP (which is assumed to belong to the core rules). But Q
contradicts the second premise not-Q; by a rule of reductio ad
absurdum this allows the negation of the supposed proposition P,
which yields the conclusion: not-P. This lengthy derivation explains
why, as reported above, MT is harder than MP.  (One should also
mention the possible lack of availability to some reasoners of the
rather sophisticated strategic rules supposition and reductio ad
absurdum).
In mental model theory, the reasoner must built integrated model(s) of
the two premises. The conditional has three models (akin to the three
lines of the truth table where it is true): [P   Q] is explicit, but the other
two, [¬P   Q] and [¬P  ¬Q] are assumed to be implicit (that is, less
available and called on as a second resort). MP is immediately solved
because the second premise P appears in the first model, where Q can
be found, yielding the conclusion. (The second and third models are
somehow irrelevant because they do not accommodate the second
premise). To solve MT, some reasoners inspect only the first model,
do not recognize ¬Q in it, and conclude that nothing follows from the
premises. Better reasoners "flesh out" the models, that is, built the
other two and notice ¬Q in the last one, which provides an integrated
model of the premises, in which ¬P can be found, so yielding the
conclusion. The necessity to flesh out the models explains the greater
difficulty of MT.
Limitation of working memory capacity is likely to be at the origin of
many  biases. When an argument is too difficult to handle, the
participant uses a fall-back strategy: rather than opting for the
commonly available "don't know" option, it may be more appropriate
to venture a response based on some superficial feature of the
sentences, with the possible bonus that it may coincide with the
correct answer. For example, compare the following premise pairs of
three syllogisms:  (i) all M are P; all S are M.  (ii) all P are M; all S are
M.  (iii) all M are P; all M are S. The conclusion all S are P is
correctly given by 90% of the participants to the first one and
incorrectly by 60% to 80% to the second one (which is invalid) and  to
the third one (to which the correct response is some S are P). If a
heuristic such as "conclude with the same quantifier as in the
premises" is applied, it is highly successful in the first case but fails in
the other two. We now turn to the question of heuristics and biases.
4. Reassessing results in the judgment and decision making
domain
The analysis used in section 3.1 based on methodological
considerations can be  applied to experimental results in other
domains. One of these domains covers studies of judgement under
uncertainty. The volume edited by Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky
twenty years ago provided an impressive catalogue of human
shortcomings, such as insensitivity to sample size, misconception of
chance, misconception of regression, illusory correlation,
overconfidence, attribution error, misunderstnding of conditional
probability, base rate neglect, conjunction fallacy, and many more
besides. Now, many of these limitations simply reflect that lay people
do not possess the sophisticated knowledge of statistician and
mathematician; this is similar to ordinary people's failing tests in
elementary dynamics that require the correct concepts of mass,
velocity and acceleration, resorting instead to their intuition based on
a world with friction. Some other results concern more elementary
skills or principles, and it can be shown that failure is not so general as
claimed by the first investigators.
Consider the two problems that have been the most studied, namely
the conjunction fallacy and the base rate neglect. The first one refers
to a classic paradigm (the Linda problem, Tversky and Kahneman,
1983) in which participants are presented with a character through a
short scenario, and then asked to estimate the probability of two
events involving the character, B (typical of the character) and A (not
typical). Over eighty percent of the participants estimate p(A&B) to
be greater than p(A), a result the authors explained on the basis of the
representativeness heuristic (B is more representative of the character
than A). However, the pragmatic analysis of the task shows that
participants are implicitly invited to compare p(A&B) with p(A&not-
B). It can be estimated that the fallacy about one quarter of the
participants genuinely commit the fallacy (Politzer and Noveck, 1991;
Dulany and Hilton, 1991). Similarly, the neglect of the base rate
information seems to be much less general than initially claimed.
Koehler (1996) reviews two decades of research and concludes that on
the contrary base rates are almost always used. In the classic paradigm
(the lawyer-engineer problem, Kahneman and Tversky, 1973)
participants are told about a sample of two kinds of professionals, the
engineer to lawyer ratio being 70/30 in one condition and 30/70 in the
other. They are presented with a personality description typical of an
engineer, supposed to have been drawn at random, and then asked to
estimate the probability that the person described is an engineer.
Because the estimates in the two conditions differed by only 5%, it
was concluded that base rates (assumed to be given by the ratios) were
neglected, even though this difference was statistically significant. In
fact, various replications have consistently produced similar results
with a somewhat greater effect, which is the important point, showing
that on the average there is sensitivity to base rates. Furthermore, as
argued by Schwarz, Strack, Hilton, and Naderer (1991), the
exploitation of the information by participants depends on the inferred
communicative intention of the experimenter; that is, emphasis put on
the description invites participants to consider the task as a request to
exhibit psychological intuition rather than mathematical skill, and
therefore to give more weight to the related information.
5. Two kinds of rationality?
The upshot of the foregoing analysis is that in reasoning experiments a
majority of people perform fairly highly provided (i) the task is not
too demanding in terms of memory load, and (ii) they have the correct
representation of the task. The former point relates to a notion
introduced nearly half a century ago: Simon (1957) initially
introduced the concept of bounded rationality in reference to humans'
limited capacity for processing information. This leaves us with the
question, What factors lead an individual towards a correct or an
incorrect task representation?
In recent years, evidence has been obtained from various sources
which suggests  the existence of two different thinking processes.
Evans and Over (1996) in particular distinguish two kinds of
rationality:
Rationality1: Thinking, speaking, reasoning, making a
decision, or acting in a way that is generally reliable
and efficient for achieving one's goals.
Rationality2: Thinking, speaking, reasoning, making a
decision, or acting when one has a reason for what one
does sanctioned by a normative theory.
A number of authors have made a similar distinction; they share  the
idea of two systems of reasoning that can be characterised as follows:
one is  automatic, rapid, associative, contextualised, and does not
require much mental load in terms of memory and computation; the
other is controlled, slow, rule-based,  decontextualised, individualised,
and is much more demanding (see Stanovich and West, 2000 for a
detailed comparison). Whereas the second system is more linked with
formal education, the first system is the product of experience (some
view it as an adaptation in the evolutionary sense): it operates
successfully and efficiently in real world situations where its use is
basically rational in the first sense.  This conceptualisation concerns
not only the reasoning domain considered earlier but also judgment
and decision making. It is argued that the various heuristics described
in this domain are instances of the application of the first system to
laboratory tasks, and the associated biases are the consequence of
applying them as if they were real-life situations. Stanovitch and West
have observed a correlation between success at the laboratory tasks
and achievement on tests of intelligence, which they interpret as
indicating that those who score higher in analytic intelligence, which
is linked to the second system, are more prone to apply this system in
the laboratory, hence a representation of the task that fits with that of
the experimenter. An alternative, not incompatible view, is that those
who have been more exposed to formal teaching have developped
metacognitive skills and knowledge which are crucial to determine the
correct representation of the task; they have also learned methods and
strategies incidentally if not purposively and consequently have better
chance of succeeding  at the laboratory tasks.
In conclusion, participants in laboratory experiments on reasoning
(and on judgment and decision making too) usually tackle the task as
if the communication was similar to an ordinary conversation in
everyday life, to which they react using whatever logical skills they
possess; if the sentences are liable to an interpretation which differs
from the literal meaning, this may lead them to a formally incorrect
response (e.g. responding by 'false' to an inference from all… to
some…) or to a correct response (e.g. responding by  'false' to an
inference from all… to no…); they are rational both in the first and the
second senses. However, the educational background of some
participants gives them a hint that they should approach the task as a
piece of scientific communication, in which every word of the
instructions has to be carefully considered, the appropriate
interpretation of the sentences and terms of the problems is given a
literal meaning, and  the information provided is necessary and
sufficient, in brief a game where, from the outset, they exhibit
rationality in the second sense. Finally, the task may exceed the
information processing capacity of the participants, whatever their
approach to it, or they may not possess the right method or strategy, in
which case they often resort to a heuristic, resulting in biases and
erroneous answers (e.g. responding by 'true' to an inference from some
A are not B to some B are not A based on the heuristic 'assume
symmetry'); using a heuristic as a last resort is rational in the first
sense.
6. Conclusion
Experimental work has demonstrated the existence of normatively
incorrect behaviour in both the domain of reasoning and that of
judgment and decision making. For practical purposes, the
significance of this finding depends crucially on the extent to which
such behaviour occurs in real-life situations. For one to reach a
conclusion, several conditions should be satisfied. One is that there
should be agreement on the appropriateness of the norm being used
(see Baratgin, in press, for a discussion of probability judgement from
this point of view). Another condition is that the experimental results
should have ecological validity. Both requirements have been the
object of much debate, especially the former in the domain of
probabilistic reasoning and decision making, and a definite answer
seems premature. The present paper has focused on yet a third
condition, namely the methodological soundness of the experiments. It
has been shown that, after a pragmatic re-examination of the
experiments, the  performance that is revealed is often much better
than it first appeared to be. Therefore, in all likelihood, the results of
some famous experiments showing an overwhelming proportion of a
population violate elementary laws of logic or probability, and
consequently basic norms of rationality, are very much exaggerated.
Now, those who wish to develop theory and practice on the basis of an
assumed human rationality need an answer to the question, What is
the "true" extent of the defective behaviour? That a few percent of a
population are concerned may be relatively harmless; that one third is
may be devastating. Unluckily, this chapter must end on a very
familiar note:  much more research is needed to answer the question
with precision.
Answers to the syllogisms:
(i) no smoker is a player
(ii) some players are not smokers
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